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Abstract 
 
Background  
An influential psychological model of persecutory delusions proposed they are caused by a 
bias towards holding others responsible for negative events, which serves to prevent underlying 
low self-esteem from reaching awareness. An early (1994) version of the model predicted self-
esteem would therefore be preserved in people with these delusions, whereas a later (2001) 
version suggested it would be unstable, and that there would be a discrepancy between their 
explicit and implicit self-esteem, with the latter being lower. Our aim was to perform the first 
comprehensive meta-analytical test of the key predictions of this model, taking into account 
evidence quality. 
 
Methods 
Reports identified in previous systematic reviews were collated. Electronic databases (i.e., 
PsycINFO, MEDLINE, EMBASE and Web of Science) were searched from 2012 to September 
2016. The review was pre-registered (PROSPERO registration number: CRD42016032782). 
Cross-sectional data from case-control, longitudinal or experimental studies that examined 
self-esteem or the externalising attributional bias in individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia-
spectrum disorder were eligible for meta-analyses of group differences, but only if at least 50% 
of participants with psychosis also had current persecutory delusions. Uncontrolled and 
longitudinal studies were included in meta-analyses of correlations and self-esteem instability, 
respectively. Study and outcome quality were assessed using the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ) assessment tool, and a modified version of Grading of 
Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE), respectively.   
 
Results We screened 3053 records, examined 104 full-text reports, and included 64 eligible 
studies. Consistent with the predictions of both versions of the model, paranoia severity in 
psychosis was positively correlated with the degree of externalising attributional bias (k=21, 
N=1128, r=0.18, 95% CI 0.08, 0.27; moderate quality). People with persecutory delusions also 
had a greater externalising attributional bias compared to non-clinical (k=27, N=1442, g=0.48, 
95% CI 0.23, 0.73; moderate quality) and depressed individuals (k=10, N=421, g=1.06, 95% 
CI 0.48, 1.63; moderate quality), and those with psychosis without persecutory delusions 
(k=11; N=480; g=0.40, 95% CI 0.12, 0.68; moderate quality). Contrary to the 1994 version’s 
predictions, paranoia severity in psychosis was negatively correlated with explicit self-esteem 
(k=23, N=1866, r=-0.26, 95% CI -0.34, -0.17; high quality). People with persecutory delusions 
also had lower explicit self-esteem than non-clinical individuals (k=22, N=1256, g=-0.88, 95% 
CI -1.10, -0.66; high quality) and similarly low explicit self-esteem to people with psychosis 
without persecutory delusions (k=11; N=644, g=-0.26; 95% CI -0.54, 0.02; moderate quality). 
Consistent with the 2001 version’s predictions, self-esteem instability was positively correlated 
with paranoia severity in psychosis (k=4, N=508, r=0.23, 95% CI 0.11, 0.34; high quality), and 
people with persecutory delusions had a greater discrepancy between their implicit and explicit 
self-esteem than depressed individuals (k=7, N=398, g=0.61, 95% CI 0.37, 0.85; moderate 
quality). They had higher explicit self-esteem than depressed individuals (k=13, N=647, 
g=0.89, 95% CI 0.51, 1.28; moderate quality), but similarly low implicit self-esteem (k=7, 
N=398, g=-0.19, 95% CI -0.45, 0.07; very low quality). Contrary to this later version’s 
predictions, they did not have a greater self-esteem discrepancy than non-clinical individuals 
(k=10; N=592; g=-0.17; 95% CI -0.45 to 0.12; very low quality). There were also no 
differences between people with psychosis with or without persecutory delusions in implicit 
self-esteem (k=4; N=167; g=-0.24, 95% CI -0.77, 0.30; low quality) or self-esteem 
discrepancies (k=4; N=165; g=0.17, 95% CI -0.19, 0.53; moderate quality).  
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Interpretation Our meta-analytical appraisal of 25 years of research found that, as predicted 
by the most recent version of the defensive model of persecutory delusions, people with these 
delusions show an externalising attributional bias, that this and their self-esteem instability are 
associated with greater paranoia severity, and that they have a greater implicit-explicit self-
esteem discrepancy than people with depression. Its predictions that they would have a greater 
self-esteem discrepancy than non-clinical individuals and people with psychosis without 
persecutory delusions were not supported, nor was the prediction of the earlier version of the 
model, that self-esteem would be preserved in persecutory delusions. To overcome the 
limitations of the observational data we reviewed, experimental studies, which may at some 
stage include interventionist-causal trials, are now required. 
 
Funding None  
 4 
 
Research in context 
 
Evidence before this study 
We searched PubMed from Jan 1, 1994 to July 31, 2018 for systematic reviews, with or without 
meta-analyses, which evaluated the defensive model’s predictions in relation to persecutory 
delusions, using the search terms (“attribution*” OR “externalis*” OR “personalis*” OR “self-
serving*” OR “self-esteem” OR “self-worth” OR “self-concept” OR “schema*”) AND 
(“psychos*” OR “schizo*” OR “delu*” OR “paranoi*” OR “persecut*”). We then reviewed all 
papers citing the two papers introducing each version of the model, and searched the 
PROSPERO systematic review database, using keywords “paranoia” and “persecutory 
delusions”. Three systematic reviews were identified, all of which used narrative synthesis to 
interpret the evidence. None found clear evidence to support either version of the model, and 
argued there was evidence against them, however all acknowledged that many of the individual 
studies were small and therefore lacked power to provide precise estimates, or detect 
theoretically or clinically relevant findings. For the meta-analyses, we collated all studies 
included in these reviews. Electronic databases (i.e., PsycINFO, MEDLINE, EMBASE and 
Web of Science) were then searched from 2012 to September 2016, using the search terms 
above. The reference lists of all included full-text articles were hand-searched. Relevant 
authors were contacted where usable but unpublished data were thought to exist.   
 
Added value of this study 
To our knowledge, this is the first meta-analysis of 25 years of research testing the key 
predictions of the defensive account of persecutory delusions. As predicted by both versions 
of this model, we found moderate quality evidence that persecutory delusions are associated 
with an externalising attributional bias. Contrary to the early (1994) version’s predictions, we 
found moderate to high quality evidence that people with persecutory delusions have 
abnormally low explicit self-esteem, and that this is associated with greater paranoia severity. 
As predicted by the later (2001) version, we found high quality evidence that paranoia severity 
is associated with greater self-esteem instability, and mixed quality evidence that, compared to 
people with depression, those with persecutory delusions have greater explicit self-esteem, 
similarly low implicit self-esteem, and a greater discrepancy between their implicit and explicit 
self-esteem. However, contrary to the 2001 version, we found very low quality evidence that 
they have a normal, rather than exaggerated, discrepancy in implicit-explicit self-esteem. 
Comparisons between people with psychosis with and without current persecutory delusions 
indicate the former have a heightened externalising attributional bias, but group differences in 
explicit, implicit and discrepant self-esteem were not evident (low to moderate quality 
evidence), thus challenging the notion that self-esteem disturbance is specifically associated 
with these delusions. 
 
Implications of all the available evidence 
The claim that persecutory delusions involve defensive processes to protect self-esteem has 
been influential yet heavily criticised, and a non-defensive account of these delusions has been 
developed. Unlike previous narrative reviews, our meta-analysis found evidence to support 
some of the predictions of the later version of this model, but not others. However, the 
observational research we have reviewed does not allow easy causal inference. Experimental 
testing of the model is therefore required, whereby the effect on paranoia and persecutory 
delusions of selectively modifying disputed aspects of the model such as implicit self-esteem 
is carefully examined. This work, which may at some stage include randomised controlled 
‘interventionist-causal’ trials, will require the development of strategies capable of changing 
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these variables in a way that bypasses explicit self-esteem, as well as more reliable methods of 
assessing change in implicit self-esteem. 
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Introduction 
 
Persecutory (paranoid) delusions involve unfounded beliefs that others are trying to harm the 
self,(1) and are a major psychiatric problem. They are present in over 70% of patients presenting 
with a first episode of psychosis,(2) often result in psychiatric hospital admission,(3) and are 
linked to increased risk of violence.(2) One influential psychological model of these delusions, 
known as the ‘paranoia as defence’ model,(4,5) proposes they emerge as a consequence of a 
bias towards holding others responsible for negative events (an externalising attributional bias), 
in order to reduce awareness of low self-esteem, with low self-esteem conceptualised in the 
early (1994) version of the model(5) as a discrepancy between one’s actual self and one’s ideal 
self (Figure 1). It proposed that holding others responsible for negative events is 
counterproductive, in so far as this may activate fears that others judge the person negatively. 
This may increase one’s attention to interpersonal threat, which may prompt even more extreme 
external-personal attributions. Thus, the 1994 version predicts that people with persecutory 
delusions ought to have a heightened externalising attributional bias and relatively preserved 
self-esteem, both of which should be related to increased paranoia severity.   
 
The later (2001) version of the model, known as the Attribution–Self-Representation Cycle 
model,(4) explicitly casts the defensive account within dynamic systems theory, and 
incorporates social psychological evidence that self-esteem and attributional processes 
influence each other in a cyclic process as the individual attempts to explain life events. This 
later version suggests that the externalising attributional bias in the context of persecutory 
delusions does not provide a complete defence against low self-esteem reaching conscious 
awareness, and that a combination of the externalising attributional bias and low implicit self-
esteem will cause self-esteem to be inherently unstable in relation to greater persecutory 
delusion severity. It also predicts that covert measurements of self-esteem and attributions will 
reveal a more negative and self-blaming cognitive architecture than overt assessments, since 
the former, but not the latter, ought to minimise activation of defensive processes. Thus, two 
further predictions of the 2001 version are that people with persecutory delusions will have low 
implicit self-esteem, measured by reaction time or similar tasks, at a level similar to those with 
depression, and there will be a discrepancy between their implicit and self-reported ‘explicit’ 
self-esteem, with the latter being higher. It also considers the origins of external-personal causal 
inferences, drawing on research suggesting they involve less cognitive effort than benign 
‘external-situational’ attributions, particularly if an individual has an attentional bias towards 
threat and difficulty understanding the intentions of others. The early and later versions of this 
model are depicted in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. 
 
In 2002, Freeman and colleagues proposed an alternative ‘non-defensive’ account of the 
development and maintenance of persecutory delusions (Figure 3).(6) In this model, 
persecutory delusions are viewed as threat beliefs, developed in the context of genetic and 
environmental risk, and maintained by several psychological processes including excessive 
worry, low self-confidence, intolerance of anxious affect and other internal anomalous 
experiences, reasoning biases, and the use of safety-seeking strategies.(7) Negative self-beliefs, 
often developed in the context of adverse inter-personal experiences, mean that the individual 
feels inferior to others, different and apart, and hence vulnerable. Paranoia feeds on this 
vulnerability. This model does not predict a discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-
esteem, nor does it claim self-esteem instability is central to persecutory delusion development 
(though it will be common in patients with emotional disorders). The authors regard low self-
esteem and negative cognitions as one of a number of interacting causes of persecutory 
delusions, which are best conceived of as ‘insufficient but non-redundant parts of an 
unnecessary but sufficient causal condition’.(7–9) Thus, this model predicts that low self-
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esteem is not sufficient for persecutory delusions to form, but may be an essential component 
of one or more complex pathways. These pathways may be sufficient to cause persecutory 
delusions, but are not essential, in so far as other complex pathways may also give rise to them. 
 
Given low explicit self-esteem is thought to be common in persecutory delusions, the existence 
of a defensive causal pathway has proven to be contentious, and the models proposing it have 
been criticised for lacking parsimony,(9) or being difficult to operationalise.(8) Proponents of 
the 2001 version of the model place weight on the hypotheses that persecutory delusions involve 
(1) heightened external-personal attributions, (2) discrepancies between implicit and explicit 
self-esteem ,(3) low implicit self-esteem, comparable to those with depression, and (4) self-
esteem instability, with greater weight currently being placed on the latter.(4) Critics of this, 
however, place particular weight on the second hypothesis, arguing that even if an external-
personal attributional bias is present, its function is moot.(8) Although the 1994 version of the 
model predicted self-esteem is preserved through the process of making external-personal 
attributions, there is disagreement over whether the 2001 version makes the same claim. 
Proponents have argued that the dynamic nature of this later version precludes such predictions, 
whereas critics have suggested that “relative preservation of mood and (explicit) self-esteem 
might be expected” if this is true.(7–9)  
 
Three recent systematic reviews did not find clear evidence to support either version of this 
model and, indeed, argue that there is evidence against them.(8,10,11) Each found evidence of 
low explicit self-esteem but limited or no evidence of an implicit-explicit self-esteem 
discrepancy in persecutory delusions. Although two found support for an association between 
persecutory delusions and self-esteem instability,(10,11) one found only mixed evidence that 
people with persecutory delusions had an exaggerated externalising attributional bias.(8) These 
reviews had two notable limitations. First, many of the studies in this field are small and 
therefore unable to reliably detect the full range of important relationships that might in fact 
exist,(12) suggesting meta-analysis may be required before firm conclusions can be drawn.(13) 
Second, their assessment of discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem were based 
on a comparison of the results between groups for each type of self-esteem separately, with just 
two exceptions.(14,15) However, it has been argued that to adequately test the hypothesis of 
discrepancy, it is necessary to analyse the difference between implicit and explicit self-esteem 
within each group as well as differences between groups.(14,15)  
 
The aim of this study was therefore to conduct a systematic review and series of meta-analyses 
to test key predictions of both the early and later versions of the model. These, and our 
methodology, were agreed in advance by both one of its leading proponents (RPB) and one of 
the leading proponents of the non-defensive model (DF). To test the 1994 version, we examined 
whether people with persecutory delusions have greater explicit self-esteem compared to people 
with depression and those with psychosis without persecutory delusions, and we also examined 
whether they have either similar or greater explicit self-esteem compared to non-clinical 
individuals. We also tested whether paranoia severity in psychosis is positively correlated with 
explicit self-esteem. To test the predictions of the 2001 version, we examined whether people 
with persecutory delusions have a greater externalising attributional bias (also predicted by the 
1994 version) and greater discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem when 
compared to non-clinical individuals, people with depression and people with psychosis 
without persecutory delusions. We also tested the hypothesis that people with persecutory 
delusions would have similar implicit self-esteem compared to those with depression, but lower 
implicit self-esteem compared to non-clinical individuals and people with psychosis without 
persecutory delusions. Moreover, it was predicted that the degree of externalising attributional 
bias, implicit-explicit self-esteem discrepancy, and self-esteem instability would each be 
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positively correlated with paranoia severity in psychosis. In contrast, we predicted there would 
be a negative correlation between implicit self-esteem and paranoia severity in psychosis. 
Finally, a number of pre-specified moderator analyses were planned to examine the effect of 
depression and study quality variables on the overall estimates.  
 
Methods 
 
This study adhered to the statement of Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and 
Meta-Analyses (PRISMA)(16) (see supplement).   
 
Search Strategy 
The reports identified in the three systematic reviews published in 2013 and 2014 were firstly 
collated.(8,10,11) Electronic databases (i.e., PsycINFO, MEDLINE, EMBASE and Web of 
Science) were then searched by PM (in consultation with PH as well as a research librarian) 
from 2012 to September 2016. Search terms related to psychosis, delusions, externalising 
attributional bias and self-esteem were used. The reference lists of all included full-text articles 
were searched to identify any studies missed in the initial search. Where useable but 
unpublished data were thought to exist the relevant authors were contacted, and all 
corresponding authors of included studies were contacted for any further unpublished data (see 
supplement for full search strategy).   
 
Study Selection 
Studies were included in the group comparison analyses if they measured externalising 
attributional bias, implicit self-esteem or explicit self-esteem in (1) people diagnosed with a 
schizophrenia spectrum condition (hereafter referred to as “psychosis”) of whom ≥50% had 
current persecutory delusions and (2) people with depression or non-clinical individuals. 
Studies comparing people with current persecutory delusions to people with psychosis without 
persecutory delusions were included in the group comparison analyses providing <50% of the 
latter group had current persecutory delusions (and, if specified, grandiose delusions). Studies 
without control group data were eligible for inclusion in the correlation analyses if (1) ≥50% of 
the sample had psychosis and (2) correlation or regression data was reported between a measure 
of paranoia/persecutory ideation and a measure of externalising attributional bias or self-
esteem. Studies comparing people with current persecutory delusions to people with psychosis 
without persecutory delusions (irrespective of the presence of grandiose delusions in the latter) 
were included in the correlation analyses. Cross-sectional data, including baseline data from 
longitudinal studies, experimental manipulation studies and trials of interventions, were 
included in the different analyses, with the exception of the self-esteem instability analysis 
where only longitudinal data were used. 
   
Studies were excluded where ≥50% of the psychosis samples had bipolar disorder, learning 
disability, a primary diagnosis of substance-induced psychosis or psychosis secondary to a 
general medical condition. When samples overlapped by ≥25% the study that reported on the 
largest number of participants was used. Only English-language studies were considered. 
Selection of studies was conducted by PM in consultation with PH.    
 
Outcome Measures and Data Extraction  
Different outcomes were selected corresponding to the different domains of the paranoia as 
defence model. A ‘data extraction hierarchy’ was developed for most outcomes; this specified 
what data were most preferable, and what data would be used if these could not be acquired. 
Because a variety of scoring methods have been proposed for attributional measures, for the 
externalising attributional bias, the hierarchy was: (1) the external-personal attribution score for 
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negative events (a measure of the tendency to attribute negative events to other people – rather 
than to oneself or situational factors); (2) the personalising bias score (a measure of the tendency 
to attribute negative events to other people rather than to situational factors); (3) the internality 
attribution score for negative events (a measure of the tendency to attribute negative events to 
oneself – rather than to other people or situational factors); (4) the externalising bias score (a 
measure of the tendency to attribute negative, as opposed to positive events, to external causes 
– either to other people or situational factors). Data from the Internal, Personal, and Situational 
Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ),(17) which can be used to calculate all four indices in the 
hierarchy above, were preferred over data from the Attributional Style Questionnaire 
(ASQ),(18) which can only be used to calculate the bottom two indices. Participants’ self-
ratings were prioritised over independent judges’ ratings.  
   
For explicit self-esteem, we preferred to use Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES)(19) data; if 
unavailable, a conceptually equivalent variant was used. We prioritised negative explicit self-
esteem data over positive explicit self-esteem data if usable total explicit self-esteem data were 
unavailable. For implicit self-esteem, we used the following hierarchy: (1) Implicit Association 
Task (IAT);(20) (2) Emotional Stroop Task (EST);(21,22) (3) Go/No-go Association Task 
(GNAT).(23) If these data were not available, a conceptually equivalent variant was used. 
Implicit and explicit self-esteem discrepancies were calculated from the choice of implicit and 
explicit self-esteem indices above using a statistical method that allowed for the analysis of 
both within and between group differences, unless already reported (see supplement for details). 
Self-esteem instability was assessed by the Experience Sampling Method (ESM);(24) or the 
repeated application of a self-esteem measure such as the RSES (see supplement). 
 
Data were extracted into a spreadsheet by PM and cross-checked by PH. Means and associated 
standard deviations (SDs) were used for analyses of group differences. Missing SDs were, 
where possible, calculated from t test values, P-values, F-values, standard errors (SEs) or 
confidence intervals (CIs) using equations outlined in the Cochrane Handbook(25) and 
elsewhere.(26) Alternatively, missing SDs were estimated from the mean SD of the other 
included studies.(27) For within-group analyses, correlation coefficients were extracted, or 
derived from regression coefficients(28,29) or from group differences between people with 
psychosis with and without current persecutory delusions using the Campbell Collaboration 
effect size calculator.(30)  
 
Meta-Analytic Calculations 
Meta-analyses were conducted using MetaXL software.(31) For group difference meta-
analyses, Hedges’ g standardised mean differences (SMD) and 95% CIs were computed. When 
a study had two or more similar groups, these were combined into one using equations specified 
in the Cochrane Handbook (Version 5.1: Section 7.7.3.8).(25) For correlational meta-analyses, 
Pearson’s correlations were converted into Fisher’s Z and 95% CIs, and any Spearman 
correlations were firstly converted into Pearson’s correlations.(32) The meta-analytical 
estimates were then back-transformed into Pearson’s correlations to allow interpretation. 
Following Cohen’s conventions,(33) a Hedges’ g of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 were interpreted as small, 
moderate, and large group differences, respectively, and a Pearson’s r of 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5 were 
interpreted as small, moderate, and large correlations, respectively.  
 
Random-effects meta-analyses using the DerSimonian and Laird method (1986)(34) were 
conducted for all outcomes.(33) When there was less than moderate heterogeneity (i.e., I2 
<40%),(25) a sensitivity analysis using a fixed effect analysis was conducted,(35) but reported 
only if substantively different. Publication bias was assessed through the Doi plot and LFK 
index for outcomes with at least 10 studies,(25) as this is considered to be a more sensitive 
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method than the funnel-plot method.(36) However, funnel-plots (see supplement) and Egger’s 
test were also conducted as additional analyses, but the latter was only reported where it differed 
from the LFK value. The ‘trim and fill’ method was applied if the LFK index indicated bias 
(LFK>2).(37)  
 
Moderator Analyses 
Two pre-specified moderators of effect size were examined: (1) matching of groups on 
demographics [age, gender, education (or a measure of IQ if not reported), ethnicity]; (2) group 
differences in depression (see supplement for definitions). Random effects meta-regression was 
used to test these moderator effects using Comprehensive Meta-Analysis version 3 software, 
but not when fewer than 10 studies in a meta-analysis provided usable data.(25) Two moderator 
analyses were abandoned due to insufficient data (<5 studies per level of variable):  the blinding 
of the outcome assessor and early vs chronic psychosis. 
 
Subgroup Analysis 
Where group differences in depression significantly moderated an effect size, a subgroup 
analysis was also conducted to further explore the influence of depression on the relevant effect 
size. For this analysis, the groups of people with persecutory delusions were coded as either 
depressed (≥ mild depression) or non-depressed (< mild depression) based on a cut-off score 
on a reported measure of depression (see supplement), and a mixed effects analysis using 
Comprehensive Meta-Analysis version 3 software was performed. 
 
Risk of Bias and Study Quality 
Following previous reviews,(38) the methodological quality of all studies was assessed using 
an adapted version of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) assessment 
tool(39) (see supplement). The quality of the meta-analytical outcomes was assessed using an 
adapted version of the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation 
(GRADE) approach(40) (see supplement). The overall GRADE rating (high, moderate, low or 
very low quality) incorporated considerations of the quality of the studies, publication bias, 
inconsistency and imprecision. 
 
Registration of Review Protocol and Subsequent Modifications 
The review protocol was reviewed and approved by experts in the psychology of persecutory 
delusions (DF, RPB) and pre-registered with PROSPERO International Prospective Register of 
Systematic Reviews (registration number: CRD42016032782). All changes to the protocol were 
decided before analyses were undertaken, and are fully detailed in the supplement.  
 
Results 
 
Sixty-four studies were identified (Figure 4, Table 1), of which 33 tested hypotheses on the 
externalising attributional bias, 36 on explicit self-esteem, 11 on implicit self-esteem, 10 on 
self-esteem discrepancies, and 4 on self-esteem instability. Excluded studies, reasons for 
exclusion, and a description of included studies are detailed in the supplement. Unpublished 
data from 6 studies were obtained.(41–46) Studies were published between 1991 and 2016; half 
(k = 32) were conducted in the United Kingdom, with the remainder occurring in Europe (k = 
17), United States and Canada (k = 10) and Australia (k = 5).  
 
Study Quality (Table 2, and supplement) 
Consistent methodological problems were non-reporting of pre-specified power calculations 
and non-blinding of researchers to diagnosis. A lesser problem was a lack of matching of groups 
on key demographic variables. Most studies selected participants in a relatively unbiased way 
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(although convenience samples were widely employed), provided adequate sample 
characteristics, and used valid and reliable measures of diagnostic status, persecutory delusion 
severity and self-esteem. However, just over a third of the externalising attributional bias 
measures were judged to be only partially reliable and valid, primarily because they represented 
the bottom two data extraction hierarchy indices (i.e., they did not distinguish between external-
personal and external-situational attributions).  
 
Meta-Analytic Outcomes (Table 2, Figures 5-7, and supplement) 
 
Externalising Attributional Bias 
As predicted by both versions of the model, people with persecutory delusions had a greater 
externalising attributional bias than non-clinical individuals (k = 27; N = 1442; g = 0.48; 95% 
CI = 0.23 to 0.73; I2 = 80%; moderate quality evidence) and people with psychosis without 
persecutory delusions (k = 11; N = 480; g = 0.40; 95% CI = 0.12 to 0.68; I2 = 53%; moderate 
quality evidence) (see Figure 5). A large difference in externalising between people with 
persecutory delusions and people with depression was observed, with the former having an 
exaggerated bias (k = 10; N = 421; g = 1.06; 95% CI = 0.48 to 1.63; I2 = 86%; moderate quality 
evidence). There was a small-moderate positive correlation between paranoia severity and the 
externalising attributional bias in psychosis (k = 21; N = 1128; r = 0.18; 95% CI = 0.08 to 0.27; 
I2 = 58%; moderate quality evidence). 
 
Explicit Self-Esteem 
Consistent with the 1994 version, people with persecutory delusions had significantly greater 
explicit self-esteem than people with depression (k = 13; N = 647; g = 0.89; 95% CI = 0.51 to 
1.28; I2 = 80%; moderate quality evidence). However, contrary to its predictions, people with 
persecutory delusions had significantly lower explicit self-esteem compared to non-clinical 
individuals (k = 22; N = 1256; g = -0.88; 95% CI = -1.10 to -0.66; I2 = 68%; high quality 
evidence) and similar explicit self-esteem to people with psychosis without persecutory 
delusions (k = 11; N = 644; g = -0.26; 95% CI = -0.54 to 0.02; I2 = 58%; moderate quality 
evidence). Also contrary to the 1994 version, a small-moderate negative correlation between 
paranoia severity and explicit self-esteem in psychosis was observed (k = 23; N = 1866; r = -
0.26; 95% CI = -0.34 to -0.17; I2 = 74%; high quality evidence).  
 
Implicit Self-Esteem 
Consistent with the predictions of the 2001 version, people with persecutory delusions had 
lower implicit self-esteem than non-clinical individuals (k = 11; N = 683; g = -0.37; 95% CI = 
-0.65 to -0.08; I2 = 66%; low quality evidence) and similar implicit self-esteem to people with 
depression (k = 7; N = 398; g = -0.19; 95% CI = -0.45 to 0.07; I2 = 34%; very low quality 
evidence). However, inconsistent with this version, no significant difference in implicit self-
esteem between people with psychosis with and without persecutory delusions was observed (k 
= 4; N = 167; g = -0.24; 95% CI = -0.77 to 0.30; I2 = 61%; low quality evidence), nor was there 
a significant correlation between paranoia severity and implicit self-esteem in psychosis (k = 4; 
N = 167; r = -0.13; 95% CI = -0.38 to 0.15; I2 = 62%; low quality evidence). 
 
Discrepancy between Implicit and Explicit Self-Esteem 
As predicted by the 2001 version, people with persecutory delusions had a significantly greater 
discrepancy between their implicit and explicit self-esteem than people with depression (k = 7; 
N = 398; g = 0.61; 95% CI = 0.37 to 0.85; I2 = 22%; moderate quality evidence) (see Figure 6). 
However, inconsistent with this version, there was no evidence that people with persecutory 
delusions had a greater implicit-explicit self-esteem discrepancy than non-clinical individuals 
(k = 10; N = 592; g = -0.17; 95% CI = -0.45 to 0.12; I2 = 61%; very low quality evidence) or 
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people with psychosis without persecutory delusions (k = 4; N = 165; g = 0.17; 95% CI = -0.19 
to 0.53; I2 = 20%; moderate quality evidence), and no significant correlation was found between 
paranoia severity and discrepancy scores in psychosis (k = 4; N = 165; r = 0.09; 95% CI = -
0.09 to 0.26; I2 = 15%; moderate quality evidence).     
 
Self-Esteem Instability 
As also predicted by the 2001 version, there was a significant positive correlation between 
paranoia severity and self-esteem instability in psychosis (k = 4; N = 508; r = 0.23; 95% CI = 
0.11 to 0.34; I2 = 38%; high quality evidence) (see Figure 7). Group differences in self-esteem 
instability were unavailable.   
 
Moderator Analyses (Table 2) 
Differences in severity of depression in people with psychosis significantly moderated the effect 
size for explicit self-esteem (psychosis with persecutory delusions vs non-clinical individuals) 
(Q = 9.42; P = 0.002; R2 = 0.49). When people with persecutory delusions were more depressed, 
they also had lower explicit self-esteem (B = -0.70; SE = 0.23; P = 0.002). However, the test of 
residual heteroegeneity was significant (Q = 31.71; P = 0.003), suggesting unexplained variance 
in explicit self-esteem group differences. No other moderator analyses were significant. 
 
Subgroup Analysis 
A subgroup analysis on the explicit self-esteem data showed that individuals with persecutory 
delusions and depression had significantly lower explicit self-esteem than non-clinical 
individuals (k = 12; N = 698; g = -0.99; 95% CI = -1.28 to -0.70; z = -6.71; P = <0.001), but 
that there was no significant difference in explicit self-esteem between those with persecutory 
delusions who were not depressed and non-clinical individuals (k = 5; N = 296; g = -0.51; 95% 
CI = -1.09 to 0.08; z = -1.69; P = 0.091). However, the difference between the 2 effect sizes 
was not significantly different (Q = 2.09; P = 0.148).  
 
Publication Bias (Table 2) 
Potential publication bias was indicated for the analyses of externalising attributional bias and 
explicit self-esteem (psychosis with persecutory delusions vs depression) (see supplement for 
funnel-plots). However, the ‘trim and fill’ method35 did not impute any missing studies; thus, 
the point estimates remained the same.  
 
Discussion 
 
Over the last 25 years, 64 individual studies involving 5363 participants (3562 participants with 
psychosis, 442 participants with depression, and 1359 non-clinical individuals) have tested the 
paranoia as defence model of persecutory delusions. To overcome the power limitations of 
individual studies, we conducted the first meta-analytical appraisal of published and 
unpublished evidence relating to both the 1994 and 2001 versions of the model. We also 
employed a method for calculating the discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem, 
thus enabling the first analysis of both within and between group differences in this outcome, 
and our pre-registered protocol was approved by exponents of both the general paranoia as 
defence model(4,5) and an alternative non-defensive model.(6)  
 
Proponents of the defensive model will be encouraged by our finding that people with 
persecutory delusions do indeed have an elevated externalising attributional bias. This appears 
to be specific to persecutory delusions, and it is associated with paranoia severity. Proponents 
of the 2001 version of the model will also be encouraged by the observed association between 
self-esteem instability and paranoia severity, and our finding that those with persecutory 
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delusions and those with depression have similarly low implicit self-esteem. That people with 
persecutory delusions have better explicit self-esteem than those with depression suggests they 
may indeed have an implicit-explicit self-esteem discrepancy relative to this group, and a direct 
comparison of their self-esteem discrepancies appeared to confirm this. Although their explicit 
self-esteem was considerably lower than non-clinical individuals, the moderator analysis 
suggests this may at least partly be a function of co-occurring depression.  
 
Critics of the model, on the other hand, might reasonably note that an elevated externalising 
attributional bias does not in itself tell us anything about its function,(6,8,9) and they may also 
be concerned by the conceptual overlap between holding others responsible for negative events 
and worrying that others wish to cause one harm.(6,47) In relation to the 2001 version of the 
model, they may acknowledge that self-esteem instability is linked to paranoia severity, but 
they may see no need to invoke defensive explanations for this, and query the specificity of its 
effects to paranoia. They may argue that the low level of implicit self-esteem observed in people 
with persecutory delusions is also predicted by the non-defensive model,(6) and that defensive 
accounts are not needed to explain why lower explicit self-esteem is associated with greater 
paranoia. They may query whether the pattern of self-esteem findings is attributable to the 
characteristics of people with persecutory delusions, or whether they actually tell us more about 
the self-esteem profile of people with depression. Moreover, a central concern of critics of the 
2001 version may be that its specific claim of an exaggerated self-esteem discrepancy in people 
with persecutory delusions was not supported by the evidence, and that a non-defensive 
account(6) reflects a more parsimonious interpretation of the pattern of findings when 
comparisons with non-clinical individuals were considered. Although explicit self-esteem may 
be higher when people with persecutory delusions are not depressed, this applies to relatively 
few people with these difficulties(48,49) – an observation which has been claimed to be 
inconsistent with a defensive model, or at the least the earlier 1994 version. There was also no 
difference in implicit or discrepant self-esteem between those with psychosis with and without 
persecutory delusions, thus casting doubt over claims of specificity. Finally, the heterogeneity 
in many of the estimates reduces the quality of the conclusions that can be drawn, both for and 
against the model.  
 
Proponents might counter that the correlation between the externalising attributional bias and 
paranoia severity observed here was small-moderate in magnitude, which is inconsistent with 
there being significant conceptual overlap between these variables. They may argue that the 
2001 version of the model successfully predicted that greater instability of self-esteem would 
be associated with greater paranoia severity(4) and, although there may indeed be non-
defensive explanations for this relationship, one strength of a model is its ability to make 
specific predictions that are subsequently supported by evidence. Although it is true that the 
relationship between explicit self-esteem and paranoia does not require invocation of defensive 
processes, it does not preclude them either. Indeed, both models predict a reciprocal relationship 
between paranoia and low explicit self-esteem. In relation to the self-esteem discrepancy 
findings, one’s view on the nature of the discrepancy in non-clinical and depressed individuals 
is key to interpreting them. If non-clinical individuals do have a self-esteem discrepancy, and 
depressed individuals do not, then it follows from the meta-analytical findings presented here 
that a self-esteem discrepancy, albeit not abnormal or exaggerated, also characterises people 
with persecutory delusions. Such a self-esteem discrepancy, it could be argued, might at the 
very least be consistent with what critics have referred to as the ‘weak’ version of the defensive 
model, which provides for scenarios whereby the externalising attributional bias in the context 
of persecutory delusions only partially fulfills its defensive function (i.e., it does not fully 
preserve explicit self-esteem but prevents explicit self-esteem from falling to the even lower 
level of implicit self-esteem).(50) Although many people with persecutory delusions are indeed 
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depressed,(48,49) there is also evidence that fluctuations in mood are strongly associated with 
the formation and maintenance of paranoia in the general population,(51) which would be 
consistent with the 2001 version’s predictions. Moreover, if depression is common in 
persecutory delusions, then an adequate test of the defensive model requires controlling for this 
in some way, since depression may indicate that defensive processes are failing to adequately 
maintain a self-esteem discrepancy. Thus, if people with persecutory delusions are generally 
depressed, then comparisons with people with depression alone may be better placed to tell us 
what is specific to persecutory delusions. Indeed, since depression is elevated in people with 
persecutory delusions, it is unclear why they do not have a much smaller discrepancy between 
their implicit and explicit self-esteem, when compared to non-clinical individuals. Although the 
current findings might be taken to mitigate against claims of a specific relationship between 
low self-esteem (whether explicit or implicit) and the presence of persecutory delusions in 
psychosis, proving specificity is difficult, and it is plausible that people with psychosis without 
current persecutory delusions nonetheless continue to carry the self-esteem risk factors for 
them. If the 2001 version of the defensive model represents an “unnecessary but sufficient”(52) 
cause of persecutory delusions, then threats to self-esteem, low implicit self-esteem and the 
presence of an externalising attributional bias should each be regarded as “insufficient but non-
redundant”(52) components of this process, therefore all may be required for persecutory 
delusion occurrence – something few studies have measured. Finally, heterogeneity in meta-
analytical estimates is often taken to reflect the presence of unknown moderators, and might 
therefore be viewed as informative. Indeed, it was variance in cross-sectional estimates of self-
esteem in persecutory delusions that first motivated researchers to examine whether self-esteem 
instability itself might be tied to paranoia severity.(4) 
 
Critics may respond to these counterarguments by noting that the modest correlation between 
the externalising attributional bias and paranoia severity could be a function of there being only 
a modest conceptual overlap between the measures of these variables, and that if the defensive 
account cannot detect differences between people with current persecutory delusions and those 
with psychosis without persecutory delusions (even those who had such difficulties in the past) 
then another model would need to account for actual delusion occurrence. They may also argue 
that people with psychosis without persecutory delusions certainly do provide a better matched 
control for testing the specificity of a model of paranoia, and that fluctuations in self-esteem, 
emotional dysregulation, and mood instability are common in many mental health disorders, 
especially where negative self-views are involved (e.g., depression, eating disorders, and 
borderline personality disorders), and that these are part-and-parcel of emotional difficulties 
and not a sign of defence processes. Negative experiences will likely trigger fluctuations in 
emotional state, and mood instability is also noted to occur in hallucinations(53) and has even 
been shown to be a vulnerability factor for depression.(54) They may conclude that a strength 
of a model is not just its predictive power, but also its parsimony – i.e., that all of the findings 
reported here and elsewhere can be explained without the need to invoke defensive processing.  
 
Overall then, there is clearly much room for continued disagreement. Based on our findings, 
proponents and critics of the defensive model are, however, likely to now agree that persecutory 
delusions are associated with an externalising attributional bias. However, whether this bias has 
a key causal or defensive function is likely to continue to be debated. Although our self-esteem 
discrepancy findings demonstrate that persecutory delusions are unlikely to involve an 
exaggerated or abnormal self-esteem discrepancy, proponents of the 2001 version of the model 
will note that interpreting their overall pattern turns on whether one believes that non-clinical 
individuals do have a discrepancy, and whether people with depression do not. Complicating 
resolution of this debate, however, are concerns over the validity of measures of current 
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measures of implicit self-esteem.(55) Noting this, Buhrmester and colleagues have argued for 
a different approach to measuring this construct:(55) 
 
“To circumvent [self-presentational processes], we suggest that respondents be interviewed as 
they reflect on their self-worth with an eye to illuminating (a) retrospective support for people’s 
assertions about themselves and (b) potential contradictions between people’s claims about 
their self-worth and their putative evidence for such claims. Defensiveness shows signs that 
people possess self-evaluations that they do not “own” when they engage in deliberate self-
report.”(55) 
 
What is also clear from our meta-analysis is that people with persecutory delusions do indeed 
have abnormally low self-esteem (whether explicit or implicit), when compared to non-clinical 
individuals. Thus, the 1994 version’s hypothesis, that self-esteem is preserved by the operation 
of defensive attributional processes, can be rejected. Moreover, there is mounting experimental 
evidence that selectively improving explicit self-esteem can cause improvements in clinical and 
non-clinical paranoia.(56–58) Thus it seems clear that, regardless of whether defensive 
processes are also at play, negative explicit self-esteem is likely to contribute directly to 
paranoia. 
 
Proponents and critics will also agree that observational research generally precludes firm 
causal inferences, even with the enhanced power afforded by meta-analysis. Thus, there now 
needs to be experimental testing of the 2001 version of the model, whereby the effect on 
paranoia and persecutory delusions of selectively manipulating attributional style, implicit self-
esteem and self-esteem instability is carefully examined. This work, which may – if warranted 
– include randomised controlled ‘interventionist-causal’ trials,(59,60) will require the 
development of strategies capable of changing these variables without also changing explicit 
self-esteem, as well as more reliable methods of assessing change in implicit self-esteem. 
Perhaps the most important test involves measuring the effect of manipulating implicit self-
esteem alone on paranoia. If a significant and selective improvement in implicit self-esteem can 
be achieved, and if this causes an improvement in persecutory delusions and self-esteem 
stability, then this would be strong support for the model.    
 
Limitations 
Resource constraints meant that we were limited to English language studies; however, it is 
unlikely that data excluded for this reason would have had a substantial impact upon the 
reported effect sizes or our conclusions. There was also an insufficient number of studies to 
carry out some of the planned moderator analyses and tests of publication bias. In addition, 
while most of the analyses produced reasonable quality evidence, the estimates for implicit self-
esteem were less reliable, in part because of the methodological problems related to measuring 
this.(10,11,61) Finally, the relative complexity of this review made it challenging to minimise 
the time-lag between search completion and publication; however, we are not aware of any 
major new studies being published since the initial search was completed.       
 
Conclusion 
An influential model of persecutory delusions(4,5) proposed they are caused or maintained by 
a heightened bias towards holding others responsible for negative events, and that this bias 
helps to prevent low self-esteem from reaching awareness. Our meta-analytical appraisal of 25 
years of research provides evidence to support several predictions of the 2001 version of the 
model, but also some evidence that does not. The 1994 version’s prediction, that persecutory 
delusions may involve preserved self-esteem, can be rejected. Experimental research that 
manipulates the key variables of interest, which may at some stage include interventionist-
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causal trials,(59) is now required to help resolve the debate, and to determine whether the 
defensive model has clinical implications for people with persecutory delusions. 
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Figure 1. The ‘paranoia-as-defence’ model: Bentall et al. (1994) 
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Figure 2. The revised ‘paranoia-as-defence’ model: Bentall et al. (2001) 
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Figure 3: A cognitive model of persecutory delusions: Freeman et al. (2002) 
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Figure 4. PRISMA Flowchart of Study Selection 
 
  
Independent datasets with useable data (k = 64) 
Datasets identified through previous reviews (k = 47) and additional searches (k = 17) 
To test hypotheses on: 
1. Externalising attributional bias (k = 33) 
2. Explicit self-esteem (k = 36) 
3. Implicit self-esteem (k = 11) 
4. Discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem (k = 10) 
5. Self-esteem instability (k = 4) 
(Several studies focused on more than one of these domains) 
Records identified through 
previous reviews:
8,10,11
 (k = 
74) 
Records identified through 
database search: 2012 to 10th 
September 2016 
(k = 2969) 
Additional records identified 
through other sources:  
Parallel literature search (k = 3) 
Reference searches (k = 1) 
Provided by authors (k = 6) 
Records remaining after 
screening (k = 104) 
Records excluded  
(k = 2949) 
Full-text articles assessed for 
eligibility (k = 104) 
Full-text articles excluded, with reasons: 
Sample not suitable (k = 9) 
No useable index of externalising attributional bias or 
self-esteem (k = 7) 
No useable index of paranoia/ persecutory ideation for 
correlational analysis (k = 7) 
No useable cross-sectional data (k = 3) 
No full-text available (k = 3) 
Potential independent 
datasets (k = 75) 
Useable data not provided or made available upon 
request (k = 4) 
 
Cannot be used in analyses due to re-use of same 
sample/participants (k = 7) 
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  Table 1. Studies Included in the Meta-Analysisa 
 
Study Ref 
(First Author, Year) Participant Group/sb (N in Parentheses) 
Relevant 
Domain/s 
Aakre, 2009 Current PDs (18); Remitted PDs (30); Remitted non-PD delusions 
(17); Non-clinical (29) 
EAB 
Bentall, 1991 Current PDs (17); Depression (17); Non-clinical (17) EAB 
Bentall, 2005 Current PDs (16); Depression (16); Non-clinical (16) EAB 
Bentall, 2008 Current PDs (39); Remitted PDs (29); Depression (27); Non-
clinical (33) 
ESE 
Ben-Zeev, 2009 Psychosis (194) ESE 
Berry, 2015c Current PDs (25); Non-clinical (25) EAB 
Besnier, 2011 Current PDs (30); Non-clinical (60) ISE 
Candido, 1990 Non-depressed PDs (15); Depressed PDs (15); Depression (15) EAB; ESE 
Carlin, 2005 Current PDs (31); Non-PD psychosis (34) EAB 
Collett, 2016 Current PDs (21); Non-clinical (21) ESE 
Combs, 2009 Current PDs (32); Non-PD delusions (28); Non-clinical (50) EAB; ESE 
Diez-Alegria, 2006 Current PDs (40); Remitted PDs (25); Depression (35); Non-
clinical (36) 
EAB 
Erickson, 2012 
 
Psychosis (57) ESE; SEI 
Espinosa, 2014 
 
Current PDs (79); Depression (38); Non-clinical (52) ESE; ISE; 
SED 
Fear, 1996 
 
Current PDs (20); Non-PD delusions (9); Non-clinical (20) EAB 
Fornells-Ambrojo, 
2009c 
 
Current PM PDs (20); Depression (21); Non-clinical (32) EAB; ESE 
Freeman, 1998 Current PDs (28); Non-PD delusions (25); ESE 
Freeman, 2012 
 
Psychosis (130) ESE 
Garety, 2013 
 
Current PDs (118); Current PGDs (52); Non-PGD psychosis (43) ESE 
Humphreys, 2006 
 
Current PDs (15); Non-PD psychosis (20) EAB; ESE 
Janssen, 2006 
 
Psychosis (23) EAB 
Jolley, 2006 
 
Current PDs (7); Current PGDs (7); Non-PD psychosis (34) EAB 
Jones, 2010 Psychosis (87) ESE 
Kesting, 2011 
 
Current PDs (28); Remitted PDs (31); Depression (21); Non-
clinical (59) 
ESE; ISE; 
SED 
Kinderman, 1994 
 
Current PDs (16); Depression (16); Non-clinical (16) ESE; ISE; 
SED 
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Study Ref 
(First Author, Year) Participant Group/sb (N in Parentheses) 
Relevant 
Domain/s 
Kinderman, 1997 
 
Current PDs (20); Depression (20); Non-clinical (20) EAB 
Kinderman, 2003 
 
Current PDs (13); Depression (11); Non-clinical (13) ESE 
Langdon, 2006 
 
Current PDs (19); Non-PD psychosis (15); Non-clinical (21) EAB 
Langdon, 2010 
 
Current PDs (35); Non-clinical (34) EAB 
Langdon, 2013 
 
Current PDs (23); Non-clinical (19) EAB 
Lee, 2004 
 
Current PDs (12); Non-clinical (12) EAB 
Lincoln, 2010 
 
Current PDs (25); Remitted PDs (25); High (25) & low (25) 
subclinical paranoia 
EAB; ESE 
Lyon, 1994 Current PDs (14); Depression (14); Non-clinical (14) EAB; ESE 
MacKinnon, 2011 
 
Current PDs (16); Non-clinical (20) ESE; ISE; 
SED 
Martin, 2002 
 
Current PDs (15); Non-PD psychosis (15); Non-clinical (16) EAB 
McCulloch, 2006 
 
Current PDs (13); Depression (15); Non-clinical (15) ESE; ISE; 
SED 
McKay, 2005c 
 
Current PDs (13); Remitted PDs (12); Non-clinical (19) EAB 
McKay, 2007c 
 
Current PDs (10); Remitted PDs (10); Non-clinical (19) ESE; ISE; 
SED 
Mehl, 2010 
 
Current PDs (23); Remitted PDs (18); Non-clinical (22) EAB 
Mehl, 2014c Psychosis (258); Non-clinical (51) EAB 
Melo, 2006 
 
Current PM PDs (26); Current BM PDs (18); Non-clinical (21) EAB 
Melo, 2013 
 
Current PM PDs (32); Current BM PDs (12); Non-clinical (25) EAB; ESE 
Menon, 2013 
 
Current delusions of reference (18); Non-clinical (17) EAB 
Merrin, 2007 
 
Current PDs (24); Depression (24); Non-clinical (24) EAB 
Mizrahi, 2008 
 
Psychosis (86) EAB 
Moritz, 2006 
 
Current PDs (13); Non-PD psychosis (10); Depression (14); Non-
clinical (41) 
ESE; ISE; 
SED 
Moritz, 2007 
 
Psychosis (35); Depression (18); Non-clinical (28) EAB 
Palmier-Claus, 2011 
 
Psychosis (256) SEI 
Randall, 2003 
 
Current PDs (18); Remitted PDs (14); Non-clinical (18) EAB 
Randjbar, 2011 
 
Current PDs (10); Non-PD psychosis (19); Non-clinical (33) ESE 
Ringer, 2014 
 
Psychosis (88) ESE 
Romm, 2011 
 
Psychosis (113) ESE 
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Study Ref 
(First Author, Year) Participant Group/sb (N in Parentheses) 
Relevant 
Domain/s 
Sharp, 1997 
 
Current delusions (19); Non-PGD psychosis (12); Non-clinical 
(24) 
EAB 
Smith, 2005 
 
Current GDs (20); Non-clinical (21) ESE; ISE; 
SED 
Sundag, 2015c 
 
Current PDs (33); Remitted PDs (10); Non-clinical (33) ESE 
Thewissen, 2008 
 
Current PDs (30); Non-PD Psychosis (34); Remitted psychosis 
(15); High schizotypy (38); Non-clinical (37) 
ESE; SEI 
Udachina, 2012 
 
Current PM PDs (14); Current BM PDs (15); Remitted PDs (12); 
Non-clinical (23) 
ESE; SEI 
Valiente, 2011 
 
Current PDs (35); Depression (35); Non-clinical (44) ESE; ISE; 
SED 
Vass, 2015 
 
Psychosis (80) ESE 
Vazquez, 2008 
 
Current PDs (40); Remitted PDs (25); Depression (35); Non-
clinical (36) 
ESE; ISE; 
SED 
Vorontsova, 2013 
 
Non-depressed PDs (30); Depression (30); Non-clinical (30) ESE 
Warman, 2011 
 
Psychosis (30) ESE 
Wickham, 2015 Psychosis (176) ESE 
Wittorf, 2012 
 
Current PDs (20); Depression (20); Non-clinical (55) 
 
EAB 
Abbreviations: BM, bad me; EAB, externalising attributional bias; ESE, explicit self-esteem; GDs, grandiose delusions; 
ISE, implicit self-esteem; PDs, persecutory delusions; PGDs, persecutory and grandiose delusions; PM, poor me; SED, 
self-esteem discrepancy; SEI, self-esteem instability. 
aA more detailed description of the characteristics of these included studies is provided in the supplement.  
bThe participants in the current and remitted delusional groups had psychosis.  
cAdditional data were provided by the authors. 
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Table 2. Summary of Meta-Analyses and Meta-Regression Moderator Analyses 
 
Outcome 
N  Included 
Studies 
Psychosis, 
N 
Control, 
N 
Hedges’ g or 
r (95% CI) 
Heterogeneity: 
I2, Chi2 P-value  
Publication bias: 
LFK index Quality (GRADE) 
Moderator:                   
N, B, SE, P-value 
Externalising 
attributional bias 
(EAB) 
        
Difference in EAB: 
psychosis with 
persecutory delusions 
(PDs) vs non-clinical 
individuals 
27 732 710 g = 0.48 
(0.23, 0.73) 
80%, P < 0.001 0.99 Moderate                  
-1 inconsistency 
Matching of 
groups:a N = 16/25; 
B = 0.45; SE = 0.29; 
P = 0.113 
Depression 
differences:b N = 17; 
B = 0.05; SE = 0.22; 
P = 0.833 
 
Difference in EAB: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
depression 
10 221 200 g = 1.06 
(0.48, 1.63) 
86%, P < 0.001 2.15 Moderate                    
-1 inconsistency                      
-1 quality (lack of 
matching, blinding 
& power 
calculations)        
+1 large effect  
                    
── 
Difference in EAB: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
psychosis without PDs 
(and, if specified, GDs) 
11 232 248 g = 0.40 
(0.12, 0.68) 
53%, P = 0.018 -0.38 Moderate                  
-1 imprecision 
── 
Correlation between 
EAB and paranoia 
severity in people with 
psychosis 
21 1128 ── r = 0.18 (0.08, 
0.27) 
58%, P = 0.001 0.70 Moderate                  
-1 imprecision 
── 
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Outcome 
N  Included 
Studies 
Psychosis, 
N 
Control, 
N 
Hedges’ g or 
r (95% CI) 
Heterogeneity: 
I2, Chi2 P-value  
Publication bias: 
LFK index Quality (GRADE) 
Moderator:                   
N, B, SE, P-value 
Explicit self-esteem 
(ESE) 
        
Difference in ESE: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
non-clinical individuals 
22 576 680 g = -0.88 (-
1.10, -0.66) 
68%, P < 0.001 0.18 High Matching of 
groups:a N = 12/21; 
B = -0.03; SE = 
0.24; P = 0.910 
Depression 
differences:b N = 15; 
B = -0.70; SE = 
0.23; P = 0.002 
 
Difference in ESE: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
depression 
13 355 292 g = 0.89 
(0.51, 1.28) 
80%, P < 0.001 2.05 
 
Moderate                    
-1 inconsistency                        
-1 quality (lack of 
matching, blinding 
& power 
calculations)        
+1 large effect 
Matching of 
groups:a N = 3/12; B 
= -0.49; SE = 0.50; 
P = 0.326 
Difference in ESE: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
psychosis without PDs 
(and, if specified, GDs) 
11 411 233 g = -0.26 (-
0.54, 0.02) 
58%, P = 0.01 -0.96 Moderate                  
-1 imprecision 
── 
Correlation between 
ESE and paranoia 
severity in people with 
psychosis 
23 1866 ── r = -0.26 (-
0.34, -0.17) 
74%, P < 0.001 0.87 High ── 
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Outcome 
N  Included 
Studies 
Psychosis, 
N 
Control, 
N 
Hedges’ g or 
r (95% CI) 
Heterogeneity: 
I2, Chi2 P-value  
Publication bias: 
LFK index Quality (GRADE) 
Moderator:                   
N, B, SE, P-value 
Implicit self-esteem 
(ISE) 
        
Difference in ISE: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
non-clinical individuals 
11 300 383 g = -0.37 (-
0.65, -0.08) 
66%, P = 0.001 -0.06 Low                           
-1 imprecision             
-1 quality (lack of 
matching, blinding 
& power 
calculations) 
Matching of groups:a       
N = 5/11; B = -0.36; 
SE = 0.28; P = 0.197 
Difference in ISE: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
depression 
7 224 174 g = -0.19 (-
0.45, 0.07) 
34%, P = 0.165 ── Low                            
-1 imprecision              
-1 quality (lack of 
matching, blinding 
& power 
calculations)    
 
── 
Difference in ISE: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
psychosis without PDs 
(and, if specified, GDs) 
4 91 76 g = -0.24 (-
0.77, 0.30) 
61%, P = 0.054 ── Low                           
-1 inconsistency        
-1 imprecision               
── 
Correlation between ISE 
and paranoia severity in 
people with psychosis 
4 167 ── r = -0.13 (-
0.38, 0.15) 
62%, P = 0.049 ── Low                           
-1 inconsistency        
-1 imprecision               
── 
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Outcome 
N  Included 
Studies 
Psychosis, 
N 
Control, 
N 
Hedges’ g or 
r (95% CI) 
Heterogeneity: 
I2, Chi2 P-value  
Publication bias: 
LFK index Quality (GRADE) 
Moderator:                   
N, B, SE, P-value 
Discrepancy scores 
(DS)c 
 
        
Difference in DS: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
non-clinical individuals 
10 269 323 g = -0.17 (-
0.45, 0.12) 
61%, P = 0.006 -0.49 Very low                    
-1 inconsistency        
-1 imprecision           
-1 quality (lack of 
matching, blinding 
& power 
calculations) 
Matching of 
groups:a N = 5/10; B 
= 0.07; SE = 0.31; P 
= 0.823 
Difference in DS: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
depression 
7 224 174 g = 0.61 
(0.37, 0.85) 
22%, P = 0.258 ── Moderate                                      
-1 quality (lack of 
matching, blinding 
& power 
calculations) 
── 
Difference in DS: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
psychosis without PDs 
(and, if specified, GDs) 
4 90 75 g = 0.17 (-
0.19, 0.53) 
20%, P = 0.287 ── Moderate                  
-1 imprecision 
── 
Correlation between DS 
and paranoia severity in 
people with psychosis 
4 165 ── r = 0.09 (-
0.09, 0.26) 
15%, P = 0.315 ── Moderate                  
-1 imprecision 
── 
Self-esteem instability 
(SEI) 
        
Correlation between SEI 
and paranoia severity in 
people with psychosis 
4 508 ── r = 0.23 (0.11, 
0.34) 
38%, P = 0.186 ── High ── 
Abbreviations: GDs, grandiose delusions; PDs, persecutory delusions. 
a‘Matching of groups’ was a binary moderator (0 = unmatched, 1 = matched). N = number of matched studies/ number of studies that provided information on matching. 
b‘Depression differences’ (quantified using the SMD, d) was a continuous moderator. N = number of studies that provided information on depression differences.  
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cDiscrepancy scores = scores on discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem.
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Table 3. Summary of findings 
 
Hypothesis Finding 
Externalising attributional bias 
People with persecutory delusions will have a significantly greater 
externalising attributional bias than non-clinical individuals 
Moderate quality evidence in favour of defensive hypothesis (both 
versions) 
People with persecutory delusions will have a significantly greater 
externalising attributional bias than depressed individuals 
Moderate quality evidence in favour of defensive hypothesis (both 
versions) 
People with persecutory delusions will have a significantly greater 
externalising attributional bias than people with psychosis without 
persecutory delusions 
Moderate quality evidence in favour of defensive hypothesis (both 
versions) 
In people with psychosis, the degree of externalising attributional bias 
will be positively correlated with paranoia severity  
Moderate quality evidence in favour of defensive hypothesis (both 
versions) 
Explicit self-esteem 
People with persecutory delusions will have significantly greater or 
similar explicit self-esteem compared to non-clinical individuals 
High quality evidence against defensive hypothesis (1994 version) 
People with persecutory delusions will have significantly greater 
explicit self-esteem than depressed individuals 
Moderate quality evidence in favour of defensive hypothesis (both 
versions) 
People with persecutory delusions will have significantly greater 
explicit self-esteem than people with psychosis without persecutory 
delusions 
Moderate quality evidence against defensive hypothesis (1994 version) 
In people with psychosis, the degree of explicit self-esteem will be 
positively correlated with paranoia severity  
High quality evidence against defensive hypothesis (1994 version) 
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Hypothesis Finding 
Implicit self-esteem 
People with persecutory delusions will have significantly lower 
implicit self-esteem than non-clinical individuals 
Low quality evidence in favour of defensive hypothesis (2001 version) 
People with persecutory delusions will have similar implicit self-
esteem to depressed individuals 
Low quality evidence in favour of defensive hypothesis (2001 version) 
People with persecutory delusions will have significantly lower 
implicit self-esteem than people with psychosis without persecutory 
delusions 
Low quality evidence against defensive hypothesis (2001 version) 
In people with psychosis, the degree of implicit self-esteem will be 
negatively correlated with paranoia severity  
Low quality evidence against defensive hypothesis (2001 version) 
Self-esteem discrepancy 
People with persecutory delusions will have a significantly greater 
discrepancy in implicit-explicit self-esteem than non-clinical 
individuals 
 
Very low quality evidence against defensive hypothesis (2001 version) 
People with persecutory delusions will have a significantly greater 
discrepancy in implicit-explicit self-esteem than depressed individuals 
Moderate quality evidence in favour of defensive hypothesis (2001 
version) 
People with persecutory delusions will have a significantly greater 
discrepancy in implicit-explicit self-esteem than people with psychosis 
without persecutory delusions 
Moderate quality evidence against defensive hypothesis (2001 version) 
In people with psychosis, the degree of implicit-explicit self-esteem 
discrepancy will be positively correlated with paranoia severity  
Moderate quality evidence against defensive hypothesis (2001 version) 
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Hypothesis Finding 
Self-esteem instability 
In people with psychosis, the degree of self-esteem instability will be 
positively correlated with paranoia severity. 
High quality evidence in favour of defensive hypothesis (2001 
version) 
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Figure 5. Forest plots for analyses of externalising attributional bias (EAB). (A) Forest plot for comparison of 
EAB between people with psychosis with persecutory delusions (PDs) and healthy (non-clinical) individuals. 
(B) Forest plot for comparison of EAB between people with psychosis with PDs and people with depression. 
(C) Forest plot for comparison of EAB between people with psychosis with PDs and people with psychosis 
without PDs [and, if specified, grandiose delusions (GDs)]. (D) Forest plot of correlation between EAB and 
paranoia severity in people with psychosis.  
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Figure 6. Forest plot for comparison of discrepancy scoresa between people with psychosis with persecutory 
delusions (PDs) and people with depression. 
 
aDiscrepancy scores = scores on discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Forest plot of correlation between self-esteem instability and paranoia severity in people with 
psychosis.  
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